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The fragmentation of the 
electoral left since 2010
Paula Surridge
The left in British electoral politics has become more 
fragmented, particularly in the past decade; those 
with economically left values are increasingly divided 
by cultural attitudes. It will be vital for Labour to find 
ways to bridge this growing divide if the party is to 
be electorally successful. 
The shape of electoral politics in Britain has been changing over the past decade, with those with ‘left-wing’ economic values becoming fragmented by their positions on other issues. This article considers how the ‘left’ in 
British electoral politics has been changing, by considering the values, attitudes and 
socio-economic positions of those within the electorate who are positioned on the 
‘left’ as defined by their economic core values. It draws on data from British Election 
Study face-to-face surveys between 1992 and 2017 in order to look at how the ‘left’ 
has evolved over the last 25 years.
To measure who is economically ‘left’, four survey items are used, based on 
responses to the following statements:
Ordinary people get their fair share of the nation’s wealth
There is one law for the rich and one for the poor
There is no need for strong Trade Unions to protect workers’ rights
Private enterprise is the best way to solve Britain’s economic problems.
In each case people are asked to express how much they agree or disagree with the 
statement on a five-point scale. The responses to the items are averaged to form a 
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scale, with low values representing the ‘left’ of the scale and higher values the right 
(the scale runs from one to five, with a notional mid-point of 3, the score that would 
be achieved by answering ‘neither agree or disagree’ to each item). Those with 
scores on this scale between 1 (the most ‘left-wing’ position) and 2.5 are defined as 
economically ‘left-wing’.
Using this scale, the proportion of the electorate on the ‘left’ – and it is important to 
stress that in this article the term ‘left’ is being used to refer to individuals whose 
views are economically on the left as defined above – has been broadly stable at 
around 55 per cent since 2005. Yet at the three general elections since that date the 
parties of the left have not been able to secure an electoral majority. My argument is 
that by further understanding the social positions, values and identities of this 
group of the electorate, as well as their voting choices over this period, we are able to 
think more clearly about who ‘the left’ are and where they may be divided by social 
positions and values beyond the economic.
Values
Much writing on the left (broadly conceived) in recent years has identified ‘two lefts’, 
one defined by economic values and one by cultural values.1 This second cultural set 
has been given various names and labels over time but here we discuss values in 
terms of a ‘Liberal-Authoritarian’ spectrum, following the labelling of those who first 
developed measures of it in the UK.2 Five items are used to measure these values:
Young people don’t have enough respect for traditional values
Censorship is necessary to uphold moral values
We should be tolerant of those who lead unconventional lifestyles
For some crimes the death penalty is the most appropriate sentence
People who break the law should be given stiffer sentences.
The scale again runs from one to five, with low values being liberal and high values 
authoritarian. It is divided into three parts, a ‘liberal’ part (values 1 to 2.6), a ‘centre’ 
part (values 2.61 to 3.40) and an ‘authoritarian’ part (3.41 to 5). We can then identify 
three fractions on the ‘left’ and compare their social locations as well as their 
political behaviour over time.
Key to understanding the evolution of political behaviour on the ‘left’ over this 
twenty-five-year period are the positions these voters take on other issues not 
reducible to the debate between the economic left and right. As Figure 1 shows, the 
position of the ‘left’ on this second dimension is deeply divided and has changed 
over the last twenty-five years. (The figures shown are for election years, but, due to 
the omission of two of the key items on the Liberal-Authoritarian scale in the 2015 
data, this election is not included in the time series presented here.)
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From the 1980s onwards, the rise of ‘new’ issues and new social movements 
associated with them, notably the feminist, anti-racist, environmental and LGBT+ 
movements, were associated with the left of British politics and the Labour Party in 
particular. But as Figure 1 shows, even in 2017, the year with the highest figure for 
the ‘liberal’ grouping, liberals represented less than a third of the electorate on the 
‘left’, and prior to this they accounted for less than one in five of voters with eco-
nomically left-wing values. The proportion of those on the left also in the ‘liberal’ 
part of the electorate has roughly doubled over the period since 1992, from 15 per 
cent to 28 per cent, but this change occurred almost entirely between 2010 and 
2017. The proportion in the ‘authoritarian’ part has fallen a little, from a high point 
in 1997, but it remains the largest group overall, at 40 per cent. Those in the ‘centre’ 
of this liberal-authoritarian divide account for less than one-third of the ‘left’-leaning 
electorate in 2017. These figures clearly illustrate the key challenge for those on the 
‘left’ of British politics: the electorate that are amenable to their economic policies 
are increasingly opposed to each other on more ‘cultural’ issues. The EU referen-
dum has thrown this into sharp focus.
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Among the ‘liberal-left’ 86 per cent voted to remain in the EU, while among the 
‘authoritarian-left’ 70 per cent voted to leave. This reflects two differences between 
the groups – on attitudes to immigration, and connectedness to the political 
process. When asked if Britain had accepted too many immigrants, 20 per cent of 
the liberal group agreed, compared with almost 90 per cent of the authoritarian 
group (the perceived consequences of this are explored further below). This might 
be expected given the close links between attitudes to immigration and the liber-
al-authoritarian value scale. However, there is also a very clear divide between the 
two groups in their views about politics and politicians (a key factor affecting 
people’s adoption or otherwise of ‘populist’ positions, itself strongly linked to EU 
referendum voting).
A sense of political efficacy
Several commentators have suggested that the EU referendum vote was (at least in 
part) driven by a desire to give the political ‘elite’ in London a ‘bloody nose’, arising 
out of a sense of disconnection with politics and political representatives.3 This is an 
important process to explore, not only for better understanding the EU referendum 
result, but also, more generally, for thinking about ways to ensure the health of 
representative democracy and democratic ideals. It is not unusual to find that those 
Renewal 26.4.indd   72 07/11/2018   11:37:13
73
CLASS, PLACE AND VALUES The fragmentation of the electoral left since 2010
who did not vote for the current government feel more disconnected and less 
satisfied with democracy than those who did so; and we might therefore expect 
those who are economically ‘left’ generally to feel some disconnection from a 
government broadly on the right. However, as Table 1 shows, this sense also varies 
substantially according to positions on the ‘liberal-authoritarian’ scale. 
Table 1: Political efficacy on the ‘left’
Liberal Centre Authoritarian
% ‘agreeing’ with the statement
Politicians don’t care what people like me think 36 50 71
It is often difficult for me to understand what is going on 
in government and politics
40 56 68
People like me have no say in what government does 44 58 75
Politicians look out for their own interests rather than for 
the people they represent
38 48 69
 % ‘saying no or don’t know’
Would you say that any of the parties in Britain represent 
your views reasonably well?
27 44 59
Each of the measures of people’s sense of political efficacy has more than two-thirds of 
the ‘authoritarian-left’ giving a negative response (i.e., feeling in some sense that they 
do not have a say in government); the figure is around 40 per cent among the liberal 
left in each case. While these figures are high for all groups, there is clearly a greater 
sense of political engagement among the ‘liberal’ group than the ‘authoritarian’ group. 
The reasons for this are complex, and in part are related to the relative levels of 
education of the groups (it is a well replicated finding that those with higher levels of 
education have higher levels of political engagement, though exactly why remains 
contentious).4 However, these patterns give an indication as to why some parts of the 
left are more open to populist appeals – which pit the people against the political elite.
It is also revealing that three out of five voters on the authoritarian left feel that no 
party in Britain represents their views. This may not be an unreasonable assess-
ment. Data from the Comparative Manifesto project, which uses content analysis of 
manifestos to derive and code policy positions, has shown a lack of political rep-
resentation for the ‘left-authoritarian’ quadrant of the value space in most European 
societies.5
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Variations according to socio-economic position
Immediately after the 2017 election, when the Labour Party gained ground in 
relatively affluent, well-educated constituencies but lost ground in those that were 
more ‘working-class’, there was considerable debate about exactly who the party now 
represented.6 But moving beyond the characteristics of areas allows for a better 
understanding of the social divides within the left, and the ways in which these 
connect to the value divides described above.
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Figure 3 shows the social characteristics of the economically ‘left’ vote within the 
groupings defined by their position on the liberal-authoritarian scale. Data shown 
are for 2017; the relationship between social position and positions on this 
‘liberal-authoritarian’ dimension has changed little over this period. Those in the 
liberal group are on average younger and better educated than those in the centre 
or in the authoritarian group. Around half of those in the ‘liberal-left’ are 
degree-educated (with a further 6 per cent currently in full-time education); 
whilst just one in ten of the ‘authoritarian-left’ have degrees. There has been 
increasing interest in this education divide in recent months, though often it 
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focuses on the divide between the well educated and the wealthy, rather than the 
divide on the left between the well-educated and those with few educational 
qualifications.7
Whilst the divide based on education is the widest, there is also a substantial 
difference in the age profiles of the groups. Over 40 per cent of the authoritarian left 
are aged 65 or over, whilst this group accounts for only 12 per cent of the liberal left. 
There are also differences in household incomes, with those in the liberal group less 
likely to be in low income households. 
These figures reflect the relationship between socio-economic position and values; 
education level and age are key influences on people’s positioning on this liberal 
authoritarian scale and so it is not surprising to find these reflected here. However, 
divides according to income are also evident, further complicating the task of 
finding the right electoral framing to bridge these gaps.
Voting behaviour
These divides on the left of British politics, and the way they have evolved, have 
clear consequences for behaviour in the polling booth. Whilst thrown into the 
spot-light by the EU referendum, crucially, these changes pre-date the 2016 vote. 
In 1997 Labour won the votes of roughly three out of five voters on the economic 
‘left’ regardless of how liberal they were. This percentage dropped to two in five in 
2010 but the pattern remained largely unchanged, with proportional levels of 
support remaining the same among all groups on the liberal/authoritarian 
spectrum of the economic left. However, in 2010 voters on the left were not even 
in their support for Labour. The liberal-left voted heavily for the Liberal 
Democrats, who were the first-choice party among this group, winning over 40 
per cent of the vote share; they were, as the saying went, ‘with Nick’. In contrast, 
the Conservatives increased their share of the authoritarian left vote in 2010 
(pre-dating the rise and collapse of UKIP and the EU referendum). In both 2010 
and 2017 the Conservatives were able to attract the votes of around one in three of 
authoritarian/economic left voters, but in 2017 they were also able to attract the 
same proportion of all the ‘not liberal’ left-leaning voters (i.e. authoritarians and 
those in the centre of this spectrum).
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Turnout in 2017 was also related to these cross-cutting value positions. The BES 
team were able to check the marked registers for those in their study who gave 
permission; this is important as there are several issues in using self-reported 
turnout, most critically a significant over-reporting of voting. Using this ‘validated’ 
vote measure, around one quarter of those on the ‘liberal’ left did not turn out to 
vote; around one third of those in the centre of the authoritarian/liberal divide did 
not vote; and two fifths of those in the authoritarian left group did not vote. This 
further reinforces the pattern of this (large) group on the economic left in British 
politics who feel disengaged from politics and political parties. Critical to the success 
of any left-leaning party in the future will lie in its ability to reach out to these voters 
and reconnect them with the political process. 
The challenge
The electorate on the left in Britain is fragmented by social/cultural values. Since 
2010 this has increasingly been reflected in the political behaviour of these groups; 
those on the left economically who are not also ‘liberal’ in their social values have 
become less likely to vote Labour, whilst the ‘liberal’ left have become more likely to 
do so (reflecting the collapse of the Liberal Democrat vote). But the economic ‘left’ 
are not predominantly ‘liberal’; its ‘not liberal’ constituency outnumber the ‘liberals’ 
by around 2 to 1. To be able to pursue progressive policies, the votes of all these 
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groups are essential. There are too few voters currently in ‘liberal-left’ positions to 
rely solely on these votes, and so a willingness to listen to and attempt to understand 
the motivations of those on the ‘not-liberal’ left is critical. 
However, the scale of this challenge cannot be underestimated. These groups on the 
economic ‘left’ have some values that are at odds with each other on some of the 
most salient issues in current British politics. As shown in Figure 2, the liberal left 
voted overwhelmingly to remain in the European Union, while the authoritarian left 
voted overwhelmingly to leave. This is an expression of the divide which is further 
reflected in attitudes to minority and/or immigrant groups. 
Attitudes to minorities/immigrants on the left
Liberal Centre Authoritarian
% ‘agreeing’ with the statement
Minorities should adapt to the customs and traditions of 
Britain
51 74 85
Immigrants are generally good for Britain’s economy 91 62 40
Britain’s culture is generally harmed by immigrants 8 35 53
Immigrants increase crime rates in Britain 10 30 54
The will of the majority should always prevail, even over the 
right of minorities
16 34 54
More than half of the authoritarian left agree that British culture is harmed by 
immigrants; with a similar percentage agree ing that immigrants increase crime. 
Fewer than 1 in 10 of the liberal left hold these positions. Perhaps of greater concern 
for those worried about the appeal of the radical (authoritarian) right, more than 
half of those with authoritarian values believe that ‘The will of the majority should 
always prevail, even over the rights of minorities’. 
These attitudes to immigration are coupled with a more ‘ethnic’ conception of the 
nation and national identity among the authoritarian left. Over half of this group say 
it is ‘very important’ to be born in Britain to be ‘truly British’, and almost 2 in 3 of 
this group say it is very important to follow ‘Britain’ customs and traditions’. In 
contrast, fewer than 1 in 5 of the liberal left take the same positions. Together these 
views on national identity, minority groups and disengagement from politics 
provide a worrying cocktail of values on which the ‘radical right’ prey. 
Thus, it is these divides which those on the economic left most urgently need to find 
ways to bridge. It is not the scope of this piece to suggest solutions: the positions 
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and debates are complex, and simple solutions will not be easy to find. It is worth 
pointing out, however, that despite being deep-seated, values are not immutable; on 
the other hand, it is unlikely that telling people they are wrong, or racist, or immoral 
in increasingly loud tones will win over hearts, or votes. Recognition of the shared 
agenda of inequality, economic insecurity and disconnection from political elites is 
far more likely to generate the sense of solidarity necessary to pursue a progressive 
agenda than to sneer disapprovingly at the values of others on the economic left. 
Sincere attempts to engage with and understand the positions of other groups with 
whom the liberal left share broad economic policy agreement will not only make it 
more likely that progressive economic politics may prevail, but may also help make 
a more progressive and positive view of democracy possible. Failure of parties on the 
left to engage with these voters leaves the space open for those on the (radical) right 
to fill, and poses a threat to democratic values and ideals well beyond the positional 
politics of left and right. 
Paula Surridge is Senior Lecturer in the School of Sociology, Politics and International 
Studies at the University of Bristol
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Data are available from www.britishelectionstudy.com.
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